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Abstract. I present a game-theoretic way to understand the situation 
describing Newcomb’s Problem (NP) which helps to explain the intuition of 
both one-boxers and two-boxers.  
David Lewis has shown that the NP may be modelled as a Prisoners 
Dilemma game (PD) in which ‘cooperating’ corresponds to ‘taking one 
box’. Adopting relevant results from game theory, this means that one 
should take just one box if the NP is repeated an indefinite number of times, 
but both boxes if it is a one-shot game. Causal decision theorists thus give 
the right answer for the one-shot situation, whereas the one-boxers’ solution 
applies to the indefinitely iterated case. Because Nozick’s set-up of the NP 
is ambiguous between a one-shot and a repeated game, both of these 
solutions may appear plausible – depending on whether one conceives of the 
situation as one-off or repeated.   
If the players’ aim is to maximize their payoffs, the symmetric structure of 
the PD implies that the two players will behave alike both when the game is 
one-shot and when it is played repeatedly. Therefore neither the observed 
outcome of both players selecting the same strategy (in the PD) nor, 
correspondingly, the predictor’s accurate prediction of this outcome (in the 
NP) is at all surprising. There is no need for a supernatural predictor to 




Newcomb’s Problem (hereafter NP) originally presented by Nozick (1969) 
runs as follows. In front of you there are two boxes, and you are offered the 
choice of either taking both or just box 2. You know that box 1 contains 
$1000. You also know that some allegedly supernatural being (the 
‘predictor’) may have put money in box 2 as well, following this rule: if he 
predicts you to take both boxes he will put nothing. If he predicts you to 
take just box 2 he will put $1m. A further fact is crucial: you know that the 
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predictor has almost always been right in his predictions. Assuming that you 
only care about the money and prefer more of it to less, should you take 
both boxes, or just box 2? 
Those who recommend taking just box 2 (so-called ‘one-boxers’) are 
typically represented as ‘evidential’ decision theorists along the lines of 
Jeffrey (1983). The one-boxers’ reasoning is said to be that, by assumption, 
the probability of the predictor predicting correctly is very high – say he is 
right in 99% of cases, whatever you choose. Hence, taking one box would 
seem to give you extremely good evidence that the predictor also predicted 
you would take one box, that is, that there is $1m in it. Learning that you are 
almost certainly just about to get this million (by taking this box) would be 
good news; you think that it is quite desirable to have $1m. On the other 
hand, if you opted for both boxes, the predictor will likewise have predicted 
this and will have left box 2 empty. Yet, in the present context, bringing 
about the piece of news that you are extremely likely to get $1000 is not 
quite as desirable. Taking one box brings about a more desirable piece of 
news than taking both boxes, so you should take box 2 only. 
‘Two-boxers’ (mostly causal decision theorists such as Gibbard and Harper 
(1978), Lewis (1981), Joyce (1999), but see also Eells (1982)) argue that 
since the predictor predicts your action, his decision whether to put the 
money in box 2 has already been made before you choose; at any rate there 
is nothing you can do to influence this prediction. Even though there is a 
probabilistic dependence between your action and the prediction (the 
correlation between one/two boxes actually being chosen when the predictor 
predicted that one/two boxes would be chosen is very strong), this 
probabilistic dependence is of no particular relevance for the ‘real’ 
desirability of the actions because it does not reflect a causal dependence; 
you can’t make the predictor predict what you would most prefer him to 
predict just by acting one way or the other. If he predicted you to take just 
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box 2, there will be $1m in it, if he predicted you to take both there will be 
nothing. Take both boxes and you get $1000 plus whatever is in box 2. Take 
just box 2 and with some luck you will turn millionaire – but in that case 
you might just as well have taken the other box too and have an additional 
$1000. Since you get $1000 more for sure by taking both boxes whatever 
the predictor has predicted it is best to take both boxes.  
 
 
2. THE NP AND THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA. 
Steven Brams (1975) and subsequently David Lewis (1979) have shown 
that a ‘two-person’ NP has the same structure as a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
game (PD).1 Recall that in a PD, the only Nash equilibrium is for both 
players to defect.2 They argue that the payoff matrix for two people playing 
a PD could look like this (first yours, then his payoff, in $): 
 
   C: he takes one = silent D: he takes both = rats 
C: you take one = silent 1m / 1m  0 / 1,001,000 
D: you take both = rat  1,001,000 / 0  1000 / 1000  
                                                          
1 That there is some similarity between the NP and the PD has also been 
pointed out by Gibbard and Harper (1978) and Horgan (1981).  
2 A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that neither player 
wishes to revise his strategy choice, given the strategy choice of the other 
player. Each player’s strategy is said to be a ‘best reply’ to the other player’s 
choice. For instance, suppose you cooperate. My best reply to this would be 
defection. But your best reply to my defection is not cooperation, since you 
are better off defecting when I defect. Hence ‘cooperate, defect’ is not a 
Nash equilibrium. For an excellent introduction to some of the game 
theoretic results used in this paper see Routledge (1998). 
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 An illustrative story along the lines of Lewis (1979) to bring life to this 
matrix might be helpful to bring out the intuitive similarity between PD and 
NP.3 So suppose that, as in the original PD, you are one of two prisoners 
separately being questioned about a crime you have committed together. 
The police has set up a clever reward system to help the course of justice. If 
you rat on your accomplice, you’ll get a thousand dollars (the money is 
already in front of you, in an enticingly transparent box). But if you don’t 
rat, your partner gets rewarded with a million dollars. The same offer has 
been made to him too.  
So if you rat (i.e. if you ‘defect’), then, if your partner does not rat, you get 
$1,001,000 (and he gets nothing), whereas if he also rats you just get $1000 
(and so does he). Conversely, if you don’t rat (i.e. if you ‘cooperate’), then 
if neither does your partner, you get $1m as a reward for your partner's 
silence (and of course so does he, as a reward for your silence). However, if 
he does rat while you don't, you get nothing (and he gets $1,001,000).   
Finally, the 'Newcomb twist': the detective tells you that comprehensive 
empirical studies in a number of states have robustly shown that in 
situations such as this one the prisoners practically always decide for the 
same option. Furthermore, the other prisoner has already made his choice. 
Actually, now you notice the black box in front of you! This box might 
contain a million Dollars! As you know that you will get the content of the 
black box anyway, should you take the transparent box too?  
It should be clear how this is both PD and NP for you. Characteristic for a 
PD is the existence of a strictly dominant strategy for both players, and the 
                                                          
3 But whether you find this particular story plausible ought not to influence 
your assessment of the general argument. 
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pareto-inferiority of the unique Nash equilibrium.4 Here the strictly 
dominant strategy for both you and your accomplice is to rat since that 
always gives an additional thousand Dollars. However, both of you would 
do better if you both cooperated by staying silent. Characteristic for a NP is 
the option of getting $1000 for sure by taking both boxes (that is, ratting), 
and causal independence but strong probabilistic correlation between your 
choice and the content of the second box. All of this is satisfied in this 
example: whether you find the million in the second box will depend not on 
what you have causal influence about, but on what the other prisoner does 
(on what the predictor predicts). The one thing you know about the 
behaviour of your fellow prisoner is that in situations such as this, the two 
prisoners practically always behave alike (the predictor predicts accurately), 
and that he has already made his choice (prediction).   
You might now be tempted by roughly the following reasoning (let’s call it 
‘evidentialist’). Given that in the past the two prisoners have practically 
always behaved alike, your cooperating (taking one box) will be evidence 
for the other player cooperating too, a situation in which, if realized, you 
would net $1m both and therefore only be convicted of the lesser crime. If 
you ratted (took both boxes), ideally he would not follow suit (the predictor 
gets it wrong and you would do even better than cooperating since you get 
the million plus the $1000 from the transparent box 1); but by the 
assumption of similarity in behaviour most probably he would rat on you 
too, and you would end up with just $1000 (the black box 2 is empty as he 
accurately predicted your taking both boxes). So, as due to the above-
                                                          
4 A strictly dominant strategy is a strategy such that, in equilibrium, you 
always do better using this strategy than using any other strategy. An 
outcome is pareto-inferior with respect to some other outcome if at least one 
agent would be better off, and no-one worse off on the latter.  
 5
mentioned similarity in behaviour between you and your fellow prisoner 
you are very likely to both make the same choice you should cooperate since 
if both of you cooperate you will get more money than if both of you 
defected.  
But there is, as in the NP, the contrary reasoning that you are better off 
defecting whether the other player cooperates or not (you prefer $1000 over 
$0 in case he defects, and $1,001,000 over $1m in case he cooperates), 
hence cooperating is strongly dominated and you should rat. Your choice 
has no ‘causal’ influence on what is rational for the other prisoner to do, 
even if there is a strong correlation. As the situation is symmetric actually 




This analogy between PD and NP provides the background for my comment 
on the NP. From the above exposition it emerges that by adopting the 
evidential decision theorist’s reasoning about the NP to the PD, he seems to 
prescribe to play ‘cooperate’ in the PD. But such a recommendation would 
clearly be mistaken.5 We have uncontroversial tools in place to solve 
problems like the PD which dictate otherwise. Specifically, game theory 
tells us that to cooperate in the PD is irrational (cooperating is strictly 
dominated). More accurately, game theory tells us that to cooperate in the 
PD is irrational provided that it is a one-shot game. But in indefinitely 
iterated games (that is, in games of finite but unknown duration and in 
                                                          
5 The above reasoning is also known as the ‘fallacy of the twins’, see 
Bicchieri and Green (1997) and Binmore (1994, 203ff). 
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infinitely repeated games) playing a cooperative strategy may be the right 
thing to do.6 So how about repeated NPs?  
I suggest that (corresponding to PDs) the best thing to do is to choose both 
boxes in a one-shot NP, and to choose one box iff the NP is repeated an 
indefinite number of times. The argument is by analogy, given the structural 
similarity between NP and PD which has been demonstrated by Lewis. 
Instead of importing the paradoxes surrounding the NP into the analysis of 
the PD, my suggestion is to export the (relatively) clear-cut game theoretical 
results about the PD into the analysis of the NP: in one-shot PDs, defecting 
is rational. Since NPs are PDs, and defecting corresponds to taking both 
boxes, taking both boxes is rational in one-shot NPs.  
In indefinitely iterated PDs, both players’ always cooperating is one (of 
many) possible equilibrium outcomes, but it is a particularly salient outcome 
since it is the pareto-efficient and symmetric outcome – it maximizes 
payoffs for both players (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for extensions to 
the concept of Nash equilibrium). Assuming that players maximize payoffs, 
they will cooperate.7 Again, since NPs are PDs, and cooperating 
                                                          
6 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 110 ff). With a ‘cooperative strategy’ I 
mean a strategy that, in equilibrium, results in both players playing 
‘cooperate’ in all stage games. For instance, a ‘grim trigger’ strategy is 
cooperative in this sense: cooperate until the other player defects, then 
defect ever after. In equilibrium, the other player will never defect for fear 
of being too severely punished provided he cares enough about the future.  
7 The ‘folk theorem’ tells us that there are many possible equilibria in the 
indefinitely repeated PD if you are a bit patient, including the pair of 
strategies ‘always defect, always defect’. The ‘problem’ with indefinitely 
iterated games is that game theory does not prescribe any particular 
equilibrium of these as more rational than any other. For instance, the 
 7
corresponds to taking one box, taking one box is the best thing to do in 
indefinitely iterated NPs. 8, 9 
                                                                                                                                                    
strategy ‘always defect’, is not ideal despite the fact that ‘always defect, 
always defect’ is an equilibrium in both the one-shot and the indefinitely 
iterated case (unlike ‘always cooperate, always cooperate’, for the best reply 
to a ‘always cooperate’ strategy is ‘always defect’) since in equilibrium you 
would do better by cooperating if the game is repeated. ‘Cooperate, 
cooperate’ is the equilibrium outcome with the highest payoffs, which 
seems to render it at least prudent to aim at, but to date there is no 
compelling ‘rationality’ argument in its favour. See Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988). Note that the deficiency is in the theory; everyone agrees in practice 
that the outcome with the highest payoffs is privileged.  
8 But which NPs are PDs? Sobel (1985, 1991) thinks that while there are 
some NPs which are PDs, there are both NPs and PDs which are not PDs 
and NPs, respectively. In (1985) he argues that PDs are only NPs if the 
conviction that the other player behaves alike is primitive (i.e., not derived 
from the structure of the situation); in other words, for a PD to be a NP 
Sobel has to allow the possibility of cooperation in a one-shot PD (e.g. if the 
players share some peculiar mental characteristic which makes them 
cooperate). I think that such a situation is either not a PD, or it is (in a 
somewhat deviant sense) and the players are cooperating irrationally – 
which makes the analysis irrelevant to rational choice theory. Indeed, Sobel 
(1991) argues, in a nutshell, that NPs are only PDs in case the structure of 
the NP is such that the predictor is nothing but the other player in a standard 
PD. In Sobel’s exposition this is obscured because the accompanying 
narrative is very different, and not symmetric for the two players: "the 
predictor ... cares mainly about the money so that being right is not worth 
$1000 to him ... in addition, he dislikes Takers, and would prefer that the 
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predictee not be one (1991: 202, italics as in original). Of course this would 
imply that any ordinary PD may be a NP, contrary to what Sobel claimed in 
(1985).  
Sobel’s confusion derives, I think, from his assumption that the 
characteristic mark of a NP is that the reliability of the predictor is primitive 
– which I deny (see below). In consequence, Sobel’s analyses fail in 
explaining the reliability of the predictor: e.g. the hypothesis (1991: 200 f) 
that ‘the predictor wants only to be right’ does not entail that the predictor 
will be right, a problem Sobel bypasses by circularly assuming that the 
player will definitely take both boxes. Of course if the predictor knows this 
he won’t have much difficulty in predicting it either.  
9 John Mackie (1977: 154) also recommends taking one box in a specially 
constructed repeated case ("the [predictor] thinks that the player’s actions 
are determined by his character ... and the player knows that the [predictor] 
believes this") and argues that "these assumptions – in particular that of 
repeated playing of the game – reverse the direction of causation and enable 
the player’s choice to determine the [predictor’s] move". But if the NP is a 
PD we do not have to talk about causation at all. Sorensen (1985) only 
considers finitely iterated PDs and NPs of known duration and does not 
reach my conclusions.  
Of course, just as there are specific conditions under which cooperation in 
finitely iterated PDs is rational (see e.g. Kreps et al. (1982), cf. Routledge 
(1998, 106ff)), there will be conditions under which it is rational to take one 
box in the finitely iterated NP, rather than two boxes, as the standard 
backward induction argument would suggest. Finitely iterated games do not 
seem to have any explanatory relevance here.  
Discussing the relation between PD and NP, Hurley (1991: 181) mentions 




What does this argument add to our understanding of the NP? It is only by 
considering the rational solutions to both one-shot and repeated NPs that 
allows us to realize that both one-boxing and two-boxing intuitions are 
entirely accurate in some cases. In particular, the causal decision theorist 
captures the right intuition for one-shot situations, whereas the evidentialist 
is correct for the selection of a strategy for indefinitely iterated games.  
But this approach to the NP is only helpful if it also explains more 
thoroughly why causal and evidential decision theorists give the ‘wrong’ 
answer for indefinitely iterated and one-shot NPs, respectively. I think that it 
does. Ultimately the defect will lie in the fact that the NP is a problem of 
game- (rather than decision-) theory, which uses somewhat different 
solution concepts, but it is nonetheless of interest to see how these 
competing intuitions may be accounted for once the game-theoretic 
background is in place. I do not attempt to give a full explanation here, but 
another look at the PD might provide some clues since there is a very 
similar puzzle about the PD.  
A common worry is how to explain the apparent divergence between the 
recommendations of ‘economic rationality’ (defect) and ‘common-sense 
intuition’ (cooperate) in one-shot PDs. The problem with the ‘rational’ 
                                                                                                                                                    
individually rational; but she thinks that even though adopting what she 
calls ‘cooperative’ reasoning from the PD to the NP is a plausible 
explanation for the one-boxers’ intuition, it is quite obviously mistaken, 
given that the NP is based on a case of a common cause (1991: 175), which 
she takes to be the best explanation for the NP’s structure. Consequently she 
argues that in a repeated NP, one should take both boxes too (1991: 190). 
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solution is taken to be that it delivers a suboptimal outcome. Proponents of 
the ‘rational’ solution usually claim that the unconscious focus on less 
abstract ‘real life’ situations provides an explanation of the appeal of the 
‘intuitive’ solution. They say that because in real life we play PDs over and 
over again with the same people (at least we hardly ever know for sure that 
the current interaction will be the last one with this player), to cooperate is 
relatively more likely to be the game-theoretically rational solution than to 
defect. One might also argue, with some plausibility, that there is no such 
thing as a one-shot PD situation in real life in the first place. All of this 
explains why to cooperate, practically always the rational solution in real 
life, seems more natural even in highly theoretical situations. 
Be that as it may, you might now think, why would specifically the 
evidentialist think of iterated games when approaching the NP? Obviously, 
if NPs are nothing but PDs then being a one-boxer is just an instantiation of 
the just mentioned intuition to ‘cooperate’ in the one-shot PD and should be 
amenable to the same explanation – the overall frequency and success of 
that strategy in real life. But there is also a good reason intrinsic to the set-
up of the NP. It is the evidentialist’s adoption of the probability as 
frequency of the predictor being right in the past as his probability as 
subjective degree of belief in the accuracy of the next prediction which 
(unconsciously) directs his attention to the repeated case. Only the 
evidentialist requires such a probability to make his decision (the causal 
decision theorist only uses ‘dominance’ reasoning in this case), but the only 
explicit probability to fix expectations in this example is the past accuracy 
of the predictions.10 The evidentialist uses the only data available, which is 
                                                          
10 Hubin and Ross (1985: 440) have similarly suggested that "controversy 
between one-boxers and two-boxers persists [because of] selective attention 
to certain constraints on the puzzle". Also see Levi (1978).  
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about the long run, to have anything at all to go by. It would be a clear 
fallacy, however, to believe that since past predictions were 99% accurate, 
the next prediction must be accurate with a probabily of 99%, too.11 
Whereas the probability the evidentialist requires is epistemological, a 
subjective degree of belief, the one he relies on is statistical. For the one-
shot scenario, this is not a good basis, but of course such long-run data 
would be more reliable for long-run prediction.  
Since causal decision theory was developed in reaction to the NP, and 
arguably similar common-cause scenarios where the evidentialists 
seemingly went wrong12 we do not have to analyze why it recommends 
taking both boxes – a major aim of the project was to provide us with a 
theory in which taking both boxes falls out as the uniquely prescribed 
outcome. In fact we knew the theory’s desired prescription before the theory 
itself even existed. The corresponding question would be why the causal 
decision theorist focuses on the causal properties of the situation to yield 
this choice. It seems reasonable to presume that the focus on causation in 
the NP derives by simple analogy from the field of probabilistic causation, 
the debate about the extent to which probabilistic correlation provides 
evidence for causal connection. 
                                                          
11 It has been argued elsewhere that it does not follow from the mere fact 
that the predictor predicted accurately in 99% of past cases that the 
probability of his next prediction being accurate is 99% too, irrespective of 
what you do. See Levi (1978, 1982, 2000). Jeffrey’s theory does not require 
one to mechanically adopt statistical data in such a way – this would indeed 
be a “bizarre theory” (Pearl 2000: 108). Also see Price (1986: 197, 1991). 
12 Whether Bayesian decision theory is unable to deliver the intuitively right 
solution in any of these cases (including the NP) is heavily disputed. See 
e.g. Levi (1978, 2000), Eels (1982), Price (1986, 1991). 
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I am not claiming that philosophers writing on the NP are confused as to 
whether the decision problem is one-shot or indefinitely iterated. My claim 
is that, as it is described by Nozick, the NP itself is ambiguous. If this is so, 
one should expect this ambiguity to be reflected more or less perspicuously 
in the proposed solutions. It is quite common in the literature on the NP to 
claim that the problem is not well specified. Some think it is overspecified 
in some respects (e.g. Hubin and Ross (1985)), some think it is 
underspecified (e.g. Cargile (1975), Mackie (1977), Levi (1978)), or even 
outright inconsistent (e.g. Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1972)). My analysis falls 
into this diverse ‘no-boxing’ tradition. But rather than rejecting the NP as 
mis-specified, I go beyond this literature by showing how this mis-
specification actually explains the observed disagreement between one-
boxers and two-boxers: the disagreement arises because the standard 
descriptions of the NP mix factors which lead one to think of a repeated 
situation with some which emphasise the one-off character of the 
interaction, and one-boxing is rational if the situation is repeated, while two-
boxing is rational in the one-off case, given the NP-PD analogy.  
For instance, the long series of past reliable predictions, the predictor 
playing continuously, and the successful ‘evidential’ one-boxers all support 
the hypothesis that the NP is a repeated game. On the other hand, the 
uniqueness of your decision, which seems one-off, and the ‘unsuccessful’ 
two-boxers make one think that the NP is one-shot. Yet as the selection of 
the right strategy crucially depends on whether the game is one-off or 
indefinitely iterated, the current debate may well be accounted for as a 
debate about what structure actually is underlying the NP situation.13 It just 
                                                          
13 What rationality prescribes in other situations discussed in this context 
often seems much less problematic (e.g. some common cause of both lung 
cancer and the disposition to smoke). Because a common cause is usually 
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isn’t clear what exactly that structure is (partly, too, because the predictor is 
said to be ‘supernatural’). As soon as the possibility of a one-shot/repeated 
ambiguity is recognized, adopting Lewis’s PD analogy and some results 
from game theory is a powerful way of clarifying intuitions.  
 
 
5. SUPERNATURAL PREDICTORS WITH INVISIBLE HANDS. 
In the preceding sections I have argued that by considering the distinction 
between one-shot and indefinitely iterated cases of the NP, together with the 
Lewisian argument about the analogy between NP and PD, the suggestions 
of both ‘one-boxers’ and ‘two-boxers’ can be rationalized. Besides doing 
analytical workt, the similarity between PD and NP also served to illustrate 
this idea since essentially the same disagreement about what is the rational 
choice occurs with the PD too, and is often analyzed along the same lines. 
But the PD can do even more work for the NP. I will argue in this section 
that if the NP is understood as ‘half a PD’ (that is, a PD seen from the 
perspective of just one of the players) not even the mystery about the 
predictor’s reliability has to remain intractable. This is a significant 
advantage of the present analysis. Ultimately, both one-boxers and two-
boxers have to claim that the predictor must be ‘magic’ since he is able to 
predict (what either party perceives to be) irrational behaviour. But if both 
taking one box and taking two boxes is rational in some situations, and thus 
easily predictable in those situations, we only need to assume that the 
predictor is able to predict rational behaviour. Assuming that we are 
                                                                                                                                                    
assumed, these situations do not share the one-shot/indefinitely iterated 
ambiguity. See Hurley (1991), who bases her argument on this observation, 
and Eells (1982, ch. 8). 
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looking for a rational solution to the NP, this seems preferable.14 The only 
challenge is to present a scenario consistent with what we know about the 
NP in which this is the case. This has essentially been done by David Lewis 
by drawing the analogy from NP to PD. I extend his argument to the iterated 
case to explain the NP in its entirety.  
We said that the accuracy of the predictor’s predictions in the NP 
corresponds to the two players’ making the same choice in the PD. But in 
the PD there is no corresponding mystery about the two players choosing the 
same option as there is about the accuracy of the predictor in the NP. It’s 
just a matter of incentives. Rather than being under the illusion that my 
choice ‘causes’ the other prisoner to behave as I do, the simple fact that he 
has the same incentive structure as I do provides an exhaustive explanation 
of the ‘invisible hand’ phenomenon of joint cooperation (or joint defection). 
I choose the strategy best for me, he chooses the strategy best for him, 
period. Since the game happens to be set up symmetrically this means we 
always do exactly the same thing: given rationality and desire to maximize 
payoffs, my fellow player defects, as I do, in one-shot games, and he 
cooperates, as I do, in indefinitely iterated games (and very rarely makes 
mistakes). But this startling similarity in our behaviour is a consequence of 
the symmetric structure of the game and not an additional ‘magic’ 
assumption. Any other rational person in this situation would do exactly the 
same thing. It is in this sense that, in Lewis’s PD analogy, the other player’s 
behaviour ‘replicates’ your behaviour and therefore predicts it. An 
                                                          
14 It is to beg the question against my analysis to claim that the fact that the 
predictor has accurately predicted both one-boxers and two-boxers in the 
past, while taking one box/two boxes is in fact irrational, shows that the 
predictor is able to predict irrational behaviour.  
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additional ‘twin’ assumption is not required here, neither for the PD, nor for 
the NP.15  
So, to take up a thread from the second section, in the PD we know perfectly 
well why the other prisoner mirrors my behaviour even without consulting 
psychologists. In the NP, however, we seem to lack any explanation for the 
success of the predictor. And it is precisely because his unbelievable 
reliability looks like an assumption of the story that the actual existence of a 
being like the predictor seems so hard to swallow (he is also said to be 
supernatural). But arguably the best explanation for the predictor being 
reliable in his predictions of your actions is still that you are being 
predictable in your actions. If we want to make sense of the NP we should 
ask whether there may be situations in which we would anyway get such 
reliable predictions without having to invoke supernatural magic, and 
whether the structure of such situations could be squared with the set-up of 
the NP. The PD is such a situation: in an ordinary PD the role of ‘predictor’ 
of your actions is automatically assumed by your fellow prisoner 
                                                          
15 To make an additional twin assumption is not just redundant, but 
inconsistent with game theory. Binmore (1992: 311) says that "The [fallacy 
of the twins] is particularly inviting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma because the 
game is symmetric". That ‘cooperate, cooperate’ is the solution prescribed 
by rationality in one-shot PDs has most prominently argued by Rapoport 
(1966) and Davis (1977, 1985). For an analysis and rebuttal of several such 
arguments see Bicchieri and Green (1997), for a more comprehensive 
analysis see Binmore (1994: chs 2, 3). Also compare Gibbard and Harper 
(1978, 157) and Horgan (1981, 180). It is not obvious that Lewis (1979) is 
not tempted by this fallacy since he talks of the other player being ‘a more 
or less reliable replica’ of you, despite the fact that in the one-shot PD, any 
rational player would defect without exception.  
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deliberating in order to get the best outcome for himself.16 Since the other 
player is in exactly the same predicament as you are, his actions are a 
perfect guide to your actions. The other player is similar to you in that he 
simulates your behaviour rather than in that he shares your mental set-up, 
and he behaves similarly because he is in the same situation as you are. That 
is to say, if you are told that in a PD your fellow player behaves exactly like 
you, this does not add any information relevant to your rational decision 
making. Since you know that the PD is symmetric you can deduce from the 
structure of the PD already that he will behave exactly like you. In the NP 
the situation is exactly the same. If in the NP you are told that the predictor 
will accurately predict your choice, this doesn’t impinge on the rationality 
of your choice. It is because choosing two boxes in one-shot and taking one 
box in indefinitely iterated games are the best choices that accurate 
prediction is possible in the first place.  
The accuracy of the predictor’s predictions will only depend on his 
knowledge of the structure of the game, of your rationality and of your 
desire to maximize your payoffs.17 It is therefore misleading to call such 
                                                          
16 Binmore (1992, 249) points this out, but rejects the present solution to the 
NP because it does not account for the fact that the predictor correctly 
predicts one-boxers too. This worry is defused by considering indefinitely 
iterated games.  
17 I am happy to accept that my solution does not apply to those NPs in 
which the predictor is infallible in principle (he necessarily predicts your 
actions correctly), but I doubt anyone would want to raise this as a serious 
objection. Even on my analysis the predictor may still be 100% reliable de 
facto – but this is contingently so. It is an advantage of my account that 
there is no discontinuity in such a case. For a discussion of infallible 
predictors see Sobel (1988).  
 17
predictive abilities ‘supernatural’ as this renders the whole NP situation 
susceptible to criticisms along the lines of Jeffrey (1983: 25): "If cows had 
wings, we’d carry big umbrellas". Maybe. But as Lewis (1979) has already 
argued, if some PDs are NPs, then the set-up of a NP should not in general 
considered to be less plausible than that of a PD. And this applies to the 




The NP is just a particularly picturesque version of a PD with half the story 
missing (as well as some added ambiguities). A major advantage of 
accepting this reductive solution is a sensible explanation of the reliability 
of the predictor which explains how the predictor both predicts one-boxers 
and two-boxers without having to be supernatural. And if the NP is just a 
PD then it is not such a difficult problem to solve after all. In one-shot 
situations the only rational thing to do is to take both boxes, but in 
indefinitely iterated games taking just box 2 provides you with a higher 
payoff. This approach also provides a rationalisation of the debate between 
causal and evidential decision theorists: one-boxers have focused on the 
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